

The military legacy of the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe in Portugal

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Background

Despite a series of international conflicts since 1756, which together constituted a real world war – the Seven Years' War – Portugal had followed the path of neutrality and managed to avoid the harmful consequences of these events. However, a naval clash between English and French fleets in Portuguese territorial waters, resulting in the defeat of the French and the pursuit of French warships as far as the fortifications of the city of Lagos on the southern coast of Portugal, led to complaints from France and the subsequent invasion of Portuguese territory by Spanish forces.

Spain, which had been neutral for several years, reversed its position after the accession to the throne of the anti-British Charles III in 1759. Charles III, who promoted the signing of a Franco-Spanish alliance, embodied in the so-called Family Pact, signed on 15 August 1761 between the various countries ruled by members of the House of Bourbon, who reigned in France, Spain, Naples, and Parma.

Under pressure to join the pact, King Jose I of Portugal refused to sign it out of respect for the diplomatic alliance of perpetual friendship and mutual assistance between the kingdoms of Portugal and England, signed in 1386, a fact that led to the invasion of the Portuguese kingdom by Spanish troops.

By 1762, King José I was King of Portugal, and his Prime Minister was Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, who would be granted the nobility title of Marquis of Pombal in 1769.

In the absence of any immediate external threats to national sovereignty and faced with the need to curb the influential power of the army in his government, especially that of the officer corps, King José I had completely neglected the maintenance of Portugal's national military apparatus.

Portugal was on the geographical and military periphery of the European continent and war had only sporadically disturbed its population. The country had been at peace since the War of Succession against Spain between 1701 and 1714. Since then, the Portuguese army had been relegated to second place on the government's list of priorities. It consisted of no more than 20,000 men poorly armed and undisciplined. Not surprisingly, the military had become

unaccustomed to bearing the weight of arms, the generals unaccustomed to ensuring discipline, and the political powers unaccustomed to providing the army with the means it needed to exist.¹

The lack of preparedness of the Portuguese army was widespread and was not only due to the number of existing troops, but above all to the lack of an entrepreneurial attitude among the permanent staff of the army, as a result of the lack of a military culture among the Portuguese elite in terms of keeping up with the evolution of warfare concepts and practices in Europe.²

The reigning Count of Schaumburg-Lippe arrived in Portugal in 1762 as part of the assistance requested by the Portuguese King from the British government to organise the military defence of a peripheral kingdom that, in the last year of the Seven Years' War, had been attacked by a Franco-Spanish army with the aim of harming British commercial interests.

An officer of recognised merit, Schaumburg-Lippe was the expert with experience in leading troops who was sent to command the Portuguese army, reinforced by British troops, and contracted Swiss fighters, with which the Portuguese King intended to resist the invasion of troops from the alliance signed between the Spanish and French crowns.

By Decree signed in the first days of July 1762, the King of Portugal appointed Schaumburg-Lippe Marshal-General of the Portuguese army under the following terms:

In consideration of the eminent qualities, merits and military experience which are found in the person of the reigning Count Wilhelm of Schaumburg-Lippe, Sovereign Count of Schaumburg, Count and Noble Lord of Lippe and Sternberg, Knight of the Royal Prussian Order of the Black Eagle [...]: Having regard to the recommendations made to me by the King of Great Britain, my good brother, cousin and ally; and wishing for all the afore-said to give him authentic testimony of the esteem and unbounded confidence I have in him, I have seen fit to appoint him Marshal-General of my armies, and to charge him with the government of the arms of all my troops, infantry, cavalry, dragoons and artillery, and Director-General of all of them, to exercise (as long as I shall see fit) these important offices in any and all parts of these kingdoms; with all the jurisdiction that pertains to the said offices.³

1 António Martins BARRENTO, O Exército Português antes e depois do Conde Lippe, in: Revista Militar, Lisboa 1991, p. 366.

2 Fernando Dores COSTA, Guerra no Tempo de Lippe e de Pombal, in: Nova História Militar de Portugal, Rio de Mouro: Círculo de Leitores, Vol 2 (2004), pp. 331-332.

3 BARRENTO, Exército Português, see note 1, pp. 371-372

The »Fantastic War«

When Wilhelm Schaumburg-Lippe arrived in Portugal on 3 July 1762, accompanied by several German officers, a column of Spanish soldiers had already made a first invasion of Portuguese territory (May 1762), crossing the border at Trás-os-Montes in northern Portugal and advancing towards Porto, the country's second largest city. This was the beginning of a war that the Spanish authorities decided to start as a precautionary measure, without an official declaration of war.⁴

Portugal was thus involved in the so-called »Seven Years' War«, a war that would come to be known as the »Fantastic War« for the events that took place in Portugal in 1762.

Fantastic, in the words of Antonio Barrento, a former Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Army and leading expert on the subject, »because, apart from a few clashes and the fall of some forts, what happened was a succession of marches and counter-marches, which amounted to a permanent game aimed at limiting the freedom of action and the superiority of the enemy. Furthermore, it was fantastical because an incapable army, as was the Portuguese army on the eve of the invasion, was transformed into a force of some value in a very short period of time. It was thus a fantastical war, in which the defence of the kingdom was achieved against forces that were much superior to its own«.⁵

Given the lack of preparation of the Portuguese military forces for war, the task that was given to Schaumburg-Lippe in 1762 proved difficult to accomplish, since it was with a Portuguese army that was far from having the status of an organised armed force that he had to devise the military defence of Portuguese territory against the ongoing invasion by Spanish forces.

For a man with battlefield experience who had kept pace with the development of the most modern armies of the day, Schaumburg-Lippe focused his first efforts on disciplining the army. He did this both morally, by trying to eliminate the main cause of high rates of desertion among soldiers and discontent among officers – the delay in the payment of wages – and materially, by providing all personnel with the best possible equipment and uniforms, ensuring that each individual was suitably equipped for their role.

4 Miguel Ángel MELÓN JIMÉNEZ, *España en la Guerra de los Siete Años. La campaña de Portugal y el Ejército de Prevención (1761-1764)*, Madrid, Sílex 2022, p. 117.

5 António BARRENTO, *Guerra fantástica: The Portuguese Army and the Seven Years*, Warwick 2006, p. 7-8.

Simultaneously with the implementation of internal disciplinary measures within the army, the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe undertook a comprehensive reorganization of the defence apparatus, encompassing the integration of all available Portuguese and foreign military forces into its structure.

He then concentrated the Anglo-Portuguese troops into formations of different sizes, which he distributed across different regions of the country. These troops were organised as follows: approximately 15,000 men were allocated to the line troops (with equal numbers of Portuguese and English soldiers), forming the manoeuvre army; and approximately 20,000 men, auxiliaries and orderlies were allocated to garrison the fortresses, forming the garrison army.⁶

Schaumburg-Lippe set up his headquarters in Abrantes, a geographically central position in Portuguese territory, where within a month of his arrival he had managed to concentrate around 7,000 men and from where he began to monitor possible areas of enemy infiltration.

The terrain between Abrantes and the nearest border crossings, namely the right bank of the River Tagus, posed significant challenges to military manoeuvrability. It was within this territory that the decisive phase of the 1762 campaign unfolded, and it was here that the Count of Lippe demonstrated his full competence.⁷

As the enemy attacks intensified, Lippe's plan of operations changed. From an initial plan based on the concentration of troops in strategic locations, with the intention of deploying them promptly and opportunistically against the areas threatened by the opposing forces, Schaumburg-Lippe, after discovering the manoeuvre of his opponent, the Marquis of Sarria, made the necessary adjustments and quickly went on the offensive.⁸

He deployed troops in the centre of Beira to block the enemy's advance on Porto and Lisbon, the country's main cities, and ordered diversionary manoeuvres on the Alentejo border. With 7,000 men at Abrantes, six British battalions at the confluence of the Zêzere and Tagus rivers and a British regiment at Sardoal, Schaumburg-Lippe decided to cross the border and attack the enemy at Valencia de Alcântara. He did so with an English regiment of dragoons, twelve Portuguese companies of grenadiers and six British companies of grenadiers. He launched a surprise attack on 27 August and was able to enter the town and subdue the small Spanish military force defending it (around

6 Miguel FREIRE, *Um Olhar Actual sobre a »Transformação« do. Conde de Lippe*, in: *Nação e Defesa*, Outono-Inverno, n.º 112, 3.ª Série, 2005, p. 148.

7 Fernando Dorés COSTA, *O conde de Lippe em Portugal e a sua reflexão sobre a defesa até 1777*, 2017, p. 1.

8 FREIRE, see note 6, p. 148.

300 men). Outnumbered and unable to put up any resistance, the Spanish defenders were forced to surrender without honour and, together with the remaining population, swear allegiance and obedience to the Portuguese king.⁹

The manoeuvres launched by Schaumburg-Lippe caused an immediate split in the enemy forces, which had concentrated their efforts much further north. While a Spanish division headed towards Valencia de Alcântara, the remaining forces of the Spanish army continued their advance towards Penamacor and Sabugal, reaching Castelo Branco in mid-September.¹⁰

In an effort to halt the enemy's advance, Schaumburg-Lippe ordered his northernmost division, which was stationed at Pinhel, to move quickly southwards, while the bulk of the Portuguese army, stationed at Abrantes, moved towards Mação to stop the Spanish advance along the Tagus river.

At the same time, the action of the Portuguese forces that had remained in the region of Almeida, a town that had been taken during the 1st invasion, were trying to hinder the Spanish forces from retreating to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Caught between two fires and with communications to the rear cut off, there was nothing left for the Spanish Army to do but to retreat through Castelo Branco and negotiate an armistice.

Schaumburg-Lippe, a man of Frederick II's military school, and an advocate of discipline, intensive training of troops, technical improvement and professionalism as a means to ensure the best use of available resources, was able to quickly manoeuvre his troops in such a way as to concentrate the fighting effort at the most opportune time and place.

His tactical action consisted of a manoeuvre based on the concentration of infantry firepower, complemented by decisive cavalry charges concentrated on specific points in the enemy's formations, usually on a flank.

By skilfully arranging his artillery on the ground and manoeuvring it at almost the same speed as his cavalry, he had the necessary conditions to defeat a poorly manoeuvred opponent, such as the Spanish Army of the time.¹¹

On 24 November 1762, the Count of Aranda, commander of the Spanish forces, recognised that there were no conditions to continue the operations and asked for a truce, which was officially accepted by Lippe one week later (1 December 1762).

9 MELÓN JIMÉNEZ, see note 4, pp. 309-310.

10 José de Carvalho FIGUERA, *O Exército português sob comando do Conde de Lippe*, in: *Revista Militar* (1982), p. 47.

11 *Idem*, p. 48.

The transformation of the Portuguese military apparatus

Despite the favourable outcome for Portugal's interests, the so called »Fantastic War« of 1762, and in particular the difficulties experienced by Schaumburg-Lippe in building up a capable military force for the defence of the country, confirmed that when the political power ignores or does not pay sufficient attention to the problems of defence, the country's military apparatus becomes almost symbolic and ceases to serve its intended purpose, since it is difficult to rebuild it when circumstances require it.¹²

The war forced the Portuguese political power to reflect on the value of a good army and the need for its efficiency in order to constantly assert the sovereignty of the Portuguese nation to other nations. For this reason, at the end of the 1762 campaign, the Portuguese political power, and in particular the then Prime Minister, did not want to neglect the military problem any longer and, delaying the departure of Schaumburg-Lippe from Portugal, took advantage of his stay to provide the Portuguese Army with a new organisation, as well as regulations designed to consolidate discipline and improve the training of troops.¹³

As demonstrated during the »Fantastic War«, the incorporation of a foreign commander-in-chief, together with a number of foreign officers, was by itself a source of transformation of the Portuguese Army because it led to a confrontation between different cultural standards, not only at the level of the military elites, but also at the level of the Portuguese political establishment. As Rui Bebianco points out, »the count was a typical »militärischer Aufklärer«, an officer of the enlightenment, with few similarities, in terms of intellectual background and military attitude, to the vast majority of Portuguese officers«. ¹⁴

It can be said that political and strategic reasons led Portuguese politicians to accept the need for transformation. After a successful campaign and the integration of an organisational structure fundamentally different from that of the Portuguese Army in 1762, it was that confrontation between different cultural standards that allowed the transformational process to continue. In fact, the integration of officers from other armies into the Portuguese Army constituted the foundation for the emulation required to implement the radical transformation of the military organisation that Schaumburg-Lippe personalised.

12 BARRENTO, *Guerra fantástica*, see note 5, p. 80.

13 FREIRE, see note 6, p. 148.

14 Rui BEBIANO, *A Arte da Guerra. Estratégia e Tática*, in: *Nova História Militar de Portugal*. Rio de Mouro: Círculo de Leitores, Vol. 2 (2004), p. 133.

Schaumburg-Lippe knew that the only way to achieve a competitive advantage over an adversary force was through a profound transformation of the Portuguese Army. He also knew that the qualitative leap in the capabilities of the Portuguese military apparatus could only be achieved through the introduction of modern organisational concepts and innovative practices better suited to the new ways of waging war. Consequently, his focus was directed towards the four fundamental components in the process of developing defence capacity: people (personnel, leadership, teaching and training); processes (doctrine); organisation and technology.¹⁵

Wilhelm Schaumburg-Lippe's legacy

According to António Martins Barrento, the legacy left by the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe to Portugal can be better understood if it is carefully analysed in the light of the immediate and long-term impact caused by the military reorganisation carried out from 1762 onwards.

With regard to the immediate and short-term impact that Schaumburg-Lippe's actions and regulations had on the military organisation of the Kingdom of Portugal, it should be noted that he, with his strategic and tactical skills, did everything he could to ensure the immediate growth of the Portuguese Army's military potential in 1762 and, through the permanent positioning and manoeuvring of the forces he commanded in the field, managed to guarantee the defence of Portugal and the peace that followed.

The 1762 campaign was sufficient to demonstrate that the Portuguese Army was in poor condition and possessed an obsolete organisational structure that required reformulation and strengthening in order to bring it closer to the models of forces that other nations had been building for a considerable time. Committed from the outset to this renewal, Lippe's actions and ideas had an immediate impact both on the prevailing mentalities of the Portuguese military and intellectual elites and on the actions of the national political establishment.

In terms of mentality, he demonstrated the possibility of defending the kingdom in the event of an attempt to invade the territory by superior forces, which counteracted the widespread apathy and boosted hope.

He was an example of enlightened leadership that was averse to incompetent staff and backward selection processes and because of that, Schaum-

15 FREIRE, see note 6, pp.143-151.

burg-Lippe introduced the Prussian principle of seniority as the basis and rule for the promotion of officers, putting an end to the old and unfair process of promotions by favour, which were from then on made exclusively by criteria of competence and merit.

Furthermore, he demonstrated a meticulous approach in his consideration of logistics and morale, perceiving these as pivotal to the long-term viability of the military organisation.

With regard to Schaumburg-Lippe's efficacy in exerting influence over prominent figures within the Portuguese political establishment, it can be asserted that with insistence and assertiveness, he managed to reverse the alienation of the government apparatus in relation to the country's Armed Forces, demonstrating that in times of crisis it was more costly to rebuild an Army that had lost its command, organisation, logistics, modernity and hope, than to have a permanent coercive force with a credible operational capacity, equivalent to that of modern European military organisations.¹⁶

We can point out as the Marshal General's main legacies in the medium and long terms, in the field of tactics, the development he promoted with regard to the training of troops and their march and manoeuvring in the Prussian style, and the joint manoeuvres involving several regiments he promoted.

With the publication in 1763 and 1764 of regulations for the infantry and cavalry, the tactical organisation that had been followed in Portugal since 1735 was set aside, and Schaumburg-Lippe modernised it according to the military standards of the time.

After the campaign of 1762, it was necessary to reduce the number of peacetime regiments to a number that suited the country's economic and social reality. Reorganised in its structure, the Portuguese 1st line armed force increased its complement to 30,000 men, distributed among 25 Infantry Regiments, 10 Cavalry Regiments, 4 Artillery Regiments, 1 Navy Regiment and 1 Royal Volunteers Regiment. By order of the Portuguese King, the 1st Infantry Regiment of the new military organisation would be called the Lippe Regiment.

In response to a proposal put forth by Schaumburg-Lippe, the main infrastructures of the country's border defence system have been rehabilitated. Concurrently, a fortification known as the »Forte da Graça« was constructed in Elvas, thereby strengthening the territory's defense. Additionally, a significant technological and scientific transformation was implemented in the artillery. This transformation gave the artillery modern characteristics comparable to those of other European countries.

16 BARRENTO, Exército Português, see note 1, p. 379.

Because of its relevance in the field of tactics, it is also worth noting the impetus given to topographical surveys of various regions of the country and the drawing of military maps, given the importance of knowledge of the terrain and available defensive positions for the deployment of forces and the execution of tactical manoeuvres.

Regarding personnel administration and the procurement of human resources, the provisions created by Schaumburg-Lippe were important in terms of filling vacancies in the army's officer corps, as well as the implementation and territorial deployment of a regional recruitment system.¹⁷

Another important aspect of the transformation was in terms of uniforms. Lippe was responsible for the publication the first uniform regulations for the Portuguese Army, which, with a few changes, lasted until 1806.

The Count of Schaumburg-Lippe thus created a military corps very different from the existing one, one with a very different image from that of an undisciplined and shabby gang. Something that was only possible through the definition of codes of hierarchy, the creation of hierarchical ranks and the definition of the corresponding functions, rules for progression in the military career, publicly displayed through uniforms and command roles. An army that was properly organised, with a head in charge and an internal hierarchy.

Maintaining discipline in the ranks was one of his main concerns, a concern that can be seen by analysing the countless pieces of legislation that were published during his stay in Portugal. The concept of material jurisdiction was then introduced for the first time in Portugal's military legal system, a concept that was widespread in Europe at the time and according to which it was the nature of the crime and not the quality of the perpetrator (personal jurisdiction) that determined whether or not it fell under the jurisdiction of military justice.

Still on the subject of military justice and discipline, it is also worth noting his concerns about the constitution of the War Councils and the corresponding authority of these bodies; unjustified absences from the ranks; the harsh penalties to be applied to deserters; the granting of leaves to troops, etc.

With regard to the attention paid by Lippe to logistics-related issues, in addition to the ever-present problems of obtaining and administering financial resources to support the Army, provisions on weaponry; ammunition; supplies and uniforms, the great revolution took place with the extinction of the old inspection bodies (*vedorias*); the reassignment of roles and tasks to different administrative bodies; the execution of financial inspections and the delegation of greater responsibilities in the field of logistics to the regimental commanders.

¹⁷ *Idem*, p. 381.

As Wilhelm Schaumburg-Lippe himself emphasises, this was not a peaceful process, as many of the Portuguese magistrates and other officials of the old administrative body who had survived the purge carried out by the Marshal General, disliked the new inspection system.

Although this change was not peaceful, it was necessary in order to put an end to privileges, clarify responsibilities and simplify circuits in the search for greater efficiency.

But more important than all the changes that took place in the field of tactics, and administrative and logistical matters, it was the vast and coherent set of doctrinal documents and regulations that he devised and had published in 1762 and 1763, containing elements on the infantry and cavalry units, the corps of engineers, the reorganisation of the artillery and the training of artillerymen. Regulations that became a reference point and the subject of compulsory study in the Portuguese Army for many years.

The concern to provide the army with a truly guiding set of doctrinal documents and regulations was one of the hallmarks of the transformation of the Portuguese Army carried out by the Schaumburg-Lippe. As is well known, military doctrine, is a set of principles and methods designed to give military organisations a common concept and a standard basis for action. Military doctrine is the basis for military training and, indirectly, for command and control.

When Schaumburg-Lippe returned to Bückeburg in 1764, he felt that the bulk of his work had been completed and he stated this publicly in a document sent to the King of Portugal entitled »Military Observations«: »There is an army. There are Laws and Articles of War. Regulations on the organisation, composition, discipline, service, training, justice, payment, and recruitment of troops. These Laws are in execution and are normally observed in almost three parts of the Regiments«.¹⁸

His departure from Portugal was regretted by much of the Portuguese population, who saw in Schaumburg-Lippe an example of modern leadership that was lacking in most of the elite of Portuguese society.

In the days that followed, it was common knowledge among the people that »only the Prime Minister of Portugal was happy with the departure of the reigning Count of Schaumburg-Lippe, marshal-general of the Portuguese army, because he was too exclusivist to support any glory or prestige in Portugal other than his own. Moreover, Schaumburg-Lippe, with the support of

18 Ernesto Augusto Pereira SALES, *O Conde de Lippe em Portugal*, V.N.Famalicão, 1936, pp. 120-136.

the army, could become an obstacle to a minister as absolute and dominant as the Count of Oeiras«. ¹⁹

With time, after the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe's return to Bückeburg, the decline of his work became more pronounced; his recommendations were forgotten, and the army showed a worrying tendency to return to the state it had been in 1762:

The exemplary regulations established by the Count of Lippe soon began to lose effectiveness, as evidenced by the fact that the [Prime] Minister, Marquis of Pombal, a man who had consistently demonstrated disdain for the military, began to issue legislation that either revoked existing statutes or undermined their efficacy. Additionally, it appeared that the majority of Portuguese officers shared a common aspiration to abolish these regulations and return to a state of negligence and laziness. ²⁰

Schaumburg-Lippe had devised a military apparatus that, like the most intricate mechanical devices, required constant maintenance. However, as time passed, this maintenance was gradually neglected.

Even though the rules still retained their outward appearance, it was clear that indiscipline was progressing daily in the army and that the officer selection process was once again suffering from the same vices that existed before he arrived in Portugal. The continuity of Wilhelm Schaumburg-Lippe's reform work had been interrupted by his premature departure from Portugal, but above all because the process of selecting the officers who would continue his work had been flawed, favouring the selection of less qualified individuals.

The lack of action or inconsistency of the political leaders in matters related to military affairs led to an erosion of discipline and order. This occurred in the first place because those leaders failed to address the situation between 1768 and 1775, when fears of a new war with Spain resurfaced.

The momentum of Schaumburg-Lippe's reforming action faded within a few years – the work had not outlived its creator. ²¹

19 Idem, p. 145.

20 Idem, p. 183

21 Fernando Dores COSTA, Guerra no Tempo de Lippe e de Pombal, in: Nova História Militar de Portugal, Rio de Mouro: Círculo de Leitores, Vol. 2 (2004), pp. 347-351.

Final remarks

To conclude, it is clear that Wilhelm Schaumburg-Lippe's legacy continues to be relevant and worthy of interest and reflection. Beyond the interest and reflection that his behaviour and work still merit today, the following aspects should be highlighted as his present-day legacy:²²

In the political sphere, the advisory relationships to the political power that he, as commander of the army, established and expanded on issues such as the downsizing of the army, militias and professional troops, the need for defence industries, the dignification of the living conditions of the ranks, etc.

These relationships are a clear indication of the healthy subordination of the Army to political power, and also of the Army Commander's recognition that his responsibilities and knowledge made him the most appropriate person to provide technical advice on these matters. It is also a recognition by the political power that political decisions on key issues relating to the operational capability of the armed forces cannot be taken without such technical advice.

Schaumburg-Lippe made a decisive effort to compromise the political power throughout the process of transforming the Portuguese army. He knew that this was the only way to continue the reorganisation he had begun after his return to Bückeberg.

In the field of strategy and tactics, issues as up-to-date as the need for defence of vital objectives in Portuguese territory; the undeniable need for the defender of the Portuguese mainland to maintain a position of strategic expectation in the central region of Portugal; the vulnerabilities of the territory south of the River Tagus and the concerns raised with regard to tactical mobility; the important role played by the collection of strategic information; etc.

In the field of logistics, the vital importance of the development of defence industries; the importance of the regiment as a key element of the logistics chain and a basic element in the organisation of the territorial apparatus; and the fundamentals of the need for war reserves.

Also, certain ideas about territorial organisation; the relevance of training for the Army's operability; the need for a peacetime force system and its growth into a wartime force system; drafting and reenlistment; the importance of the supervisory and control roles; and also, elements for the dialectic between professional military forces and compulsory military service.

Finally, in the educational field. In addition to all that has already been said, there is the realisation of the imperative need to train and update the knowl-

22 BARRENTO, *Guerra fantástica*, see note 5, p. 80.

edge of the staff, especially on war-related scientific subjects; because only the continuous modernisation of the armed forces serves the needs of the country's military defence and acts as a sign of hope for those who serve in it – the military – and as a guarantee of security for those who must rely on it, i.e. the citizens as a whole.

In conclusion, the legacy of Wilhelm Schaumburg-Lippe is not limited to books and documents that we can read in transcripts, or that quietly sleep in the dust of the archives. His legacy is an example of professionalism and shows the transcendence of the complex mission assigned to all those responsible for the military defence of a country and the timeliness of many of his concerns.

We, therefore, believe that, deep down in the hearts of the Portuguese people, Marshal General Count of Schaumburg-Lippe will always be remembered and respected; and that all those who wear the honourable uniform of a soldier, will never forget that he was general-in-chief of the Portuguese army. An army that will always remember him and recognise him for his enlightened command in war and peace; for his wise and fruitful contributions to the instruction, education and improvement of the living conditions of the troops; and, above all, for his highest examples of integrity and military honour.